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Comment
CHOICE OF LAW RULES IN TORT CASESA COMING CONFLICT IN MISSOURI
I. INMODUCTION
The area of conflict of laws has been aptly termed "a dismal. swamp, filled
with quaking, quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who
theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon."'
Within this swamp there has been at least one small isle of stability where the
ordinary court, the practicing lawyer, and the much harrassed student could stand
on firm ground and confidently proclaim :unquestioned -black letter law. When an
action was brought in one jurisdiction for a tort which had occurred in another,
any observer could with reasonable accuracy predict which state's law would be
applied. In Missouri2 and virtually all other jurisdictions3 the substantive righii
of the parties were determined by the lex loci deliciti or the law of the place
of the wrong rather than the lex fori or the law of the forum. Considering the
status of this area, it is surprising to learn that recently many noted scholars and
some of the more progressive courts have devoted much of their time and efforts
toward undermining the rule of lex loci deliciti thereby making this isle of stability
as much a quaking quagmire of uncertainty as the rest of the conflicts area.
It is the purpose of this comment to review and evaluate the traditional
rule; to attempt to determine whether the traditional rule should be abandoned;
and if so which, if any, of the proposed new rules should replace it. An attempt
will also be made to-show the probable effect the adoption of certain of these new
rules would have on selected areas of Missouri law.
In order to evaluate properly the existing and proposed choice of law rules
it is necessary to identify the policies and values which those rules should further.
Once the policies and values have been identified then they-may be utilized as a
type of conceptual framework against which the "rightness" of these rules may
be measured, "since the ultimate success of a rule will depend upon how effective
it is in furthering these policies." 4 It is clear that such a measurement must in
part be qualitative, rather than solely quantitative, and that opinions differ as to
the importance of the various policies. It must be recognized that any such
measurement will be -subject to certain inherent weaknesses, but it would seem
to be the most accurate means of evaluating choice of law rules.
1. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MicH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953).
2. Hall Motor Freight v. Montgomery, 357 Mo. 1188, 212 S.W.2d 748 (1948);
Fogarty v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 180 Mo. 490, 79 S.W. 644 (1904).
3. 16 Ait. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 71 (1964); 15 A. C.J.S. Conflict of
Laws- § 12 (2) (1967).
-4. Reese, Conflict of 'Laws and The Restatement Second, 28 LAw &
CoTr'mxp. PRoB. 679, 681 (1963).
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While many attempts have been made to identify and state choice of law
policies, Robert A. Leflar has contribute4 one of the most concise, but comprehensive lists of these policies. The policies are' termed by him choice-influencing
considerations and include:
A. Predictability of results;
B. Maintenance of interstate- and international order;
C. Simplification of the judicial task;
D. Advancement of the forum's governmental. interests;
E. Application of the better rule of law.5
Leflar did not intend the order of the above list to indicate any priority.0
II. THE CONTENDING RULES

A. The Traditional Approach
As late as 1875 the application of the lex fori to torts which had occurred in
other states was "almost too familiar a principle for discussion or authority." 7
Only five years later the United States Supreme Court applied what has now
become the traditional approach, the rule of lex loci deliciti.3 This rule was an
outgrowth of the vested rights theory9 in vogue at that time. 10 The rule was
applied only to substantive law and courts used the forum's procedural rules. 1
The place where the tort occurred has normally been held to be where "the last
event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."' 2 In
recent years the traditional rule has come under considerable criticism by numerous writers'8 and courts.1 4 At least one court has gone so far as to state that
"no American court which has felt free to re-examine the matter thoroughly in the
5. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
Ra,. 267, 282 (1966).
6. Compare with the lists in Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable
Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952), and Yntema, The Objectives of Private InternationalLaw, 35 CAN. B. REV. 721 (1957). For a case in which Leflar's choiceinfluencing considerations were applied in reaching a decision see Clark v. Clark,
107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
7. Anderson v. The Milwaukee &St. Paul Ry., 37 Wis. 321, 322 (1875).
8. Dennick v. Central R.R., 103 U.S. 11 (1880).
9. See generally Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their
Role and Utility, 58 HA.v. L. REv. 361 (1945).
10. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 211 (1962).

11. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. App. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Russell
v. Kotsch, 336 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1960); Robinson v. Gaines, 331 S.W.2d 653
(Mo. 1960).
12. Gaston v. Wabash R.R., 322 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Mo. En Banc 1959);
REsTATE'mENT, CoNIfCr

OF LAWS

§ 377 (1934); See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d

1266 (1961).
13. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, Towards a Theory of
Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595
(1960); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HAxv. L. Rav. -881 (1951).
14. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963). Casey v. Manson Constr. and Eng'r Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Ore. 1967);
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/11
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last decade has chosen to retain the old rule." 15 In order better to determine
the validity of this criticism, the rule shall be tested as -to whether or not it
furthers those policies or choice-influencing considerations set out by Leflar.
1. Advocates of this rule assert that one of its great virtues is that it provides
predictable results and thereby discourages forum shopping. 16 This would seem
to be the case since once it is determined where the tort occurred, the law of that
state would be applied regardless of the forum selected. There are, however,
students of the area who argue that even this virtue is illusory. They point out
that the rule is so inflexible that courts often utilize the devices of characterization,
public policy and renvoi to avoid harsh results. 17 While these devices may provide
flexibility they weaken one's ability to predict the result when courts purport to
apply the rule.
2. Leflar's main concern in his second choice-influencing consideration is that
the forum state will give due deference to the laws of other states. The traditional rule would seem to give such deference since it applies the law of the state
where the tort occurred rather than the law of the forum. Thus while the application of the traditional rule might not result in the law of the most interested
state being applied, it would normally produce sufficiently impartial results to
obviate the possibility of judicial jealousy between neighboring states.
3. The traditional rule simplifies the judicial task by making the choice of
which state's law to apply relatively easy to determine. Since judges are normally
more familiar with the law of the forum state it does, however, make the judicial task more difficult by often requiring that the court apply another state's
substantive law.
4. The rule of lex loci deliciti may require the application of another state's
laws without regard to the forum state's governmental interests in the case.
Therefore, itclearly is not a rule which furthers the forum's governmental interests.
5. The traditional rule does not take into account whether either of the laws
the court might apply is superior. If the better rule of law is applied it is merely
fortuitous. Thus this rule does not further the policy of applying the better rule of
law.
B. The Restatements Approach

In response to the mounting criticism of the traditional rule a number of new
rules were proposed as possible replacements. Probably the most widely proclaimed
of the proposed new rules is the one set out in section 379 of Restatement (Second),
Conflict of Laws, (1958). This section provides that:
15. Clark v.Clark, 107 N.H.351, - , 222 A.2d 205, 207 (1966).
16. Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Currie, Survival of Actions:
Adjudication Versus Automation In the Conflict of Law, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205

(1958); Note, 54 Ky. L.J..728 (1966).
17. Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 10 at 545; Comment, 15 KAN. L. REv.
69 (1966).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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(1) The local law of the state which has the most significanti rela tionships with the occurrence and with -the parties determines their rights
and liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining
the state of the most significant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place. of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the
forum will consider the issues; the character of the-tort, and the relevant'
purposes of the tort rules of the interested states.' 8
The most significant changes in Restatement (Second) involve the change from
the rule of lex loci deliciti to the law of the state with the most significant relationship and the stating of separate rules of greater precision for certain types of
torts. The section quoted above states the general principle that is applicable to all
torts and it is to this principle that our attention is primarily directed. The
contacts listed in subsection (2) of section 379 are listed in what will normally
be their order of importance. Courts may, however, utilize the factors set out in
subsection (3) to determine the relative importance of these contacts. In some
cases it may be found that the order of importance will be changed and in a few
situations some of the contacts may be dismissed as of no importance. It can be
argued that the Restatement's approach will not require the application of a different state's law in most cases than that required under the old rule of lex loci
deliciti. Except in rare cases the conduct causing the injury and the injury will
occur in the same state, and since these are normally considered the two most
important contacts "that state will usually be the state of most significant relationship with respect to most issues involving the tort."' 9
The first case to flatly reject the traditional approach and adopt the Restatement's approach was the New York case of Babcock v. Jackson.20 Since that case
a number of other courts 2' have rejected the traditional approach and adopted
either the Restatement's or a modified version of that approach.
This new approach has not however, suffered a lack of critics. A number of
courts 22 have specifically rejected it in favor of the traditional approach and
18.
1964).
19.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

CONFLICT oF LAws

§ 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

CONFLICT OF LAws

§ 379, comment 5 (Tent.

Draft No. 9, 1964).

20. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
21. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Casey v. Manson
Construction and Engineering Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Ore. 1967); Griffith v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d
617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
22. Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); White v. King, 244 Md.
348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966); Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963);
I
Oshiek v. Oshiek, 224 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/11
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even some of the writers23 most critical of the traditional approach are not ready
to accept it as a suitable replacement. The next step is to determine ivhether the
Restatement's approach serves to further the policies' or choice-influencing considerations set out by Leflar.
1. It is generally agreed by courts2 4 and writers2 5 dealing with the Restatement's approach that it does not provide for predictability of results and that it
will promote forum shopping. One court justified its refusal to abandon the traditional approach by stating that it did "not deem it wise to voyage into such
an uncharted sea, leaving behind well established conflict of laws rules" 26
Even the supporters of the new approach admit that it is not as certain ot
predictable as the traditional approach. They seek to justify or excuse this weakness by observations such as "uniformity, certainty, and predictability of result
are not as important values in this area as they are in contracts;" 27 that this is
"a workable, fair and flexible approach to choice of law which will become more
certain as it is tested and further refined when applied to specific cases before our
courts;" 28 and that "continued adherence to a bad rule is a high price to pay for
predictability." 29
2. The use of this approach would give due deference to the laws of other
interested states and should not interfere with the maintenance of interstate and
international order.
3. There can be little doubt that this approach will make the judicial task
more difficult than it was under the traditional approach. In most cases, however,
the law to be applied will be fairly clear. It is in cases where two or more states
have contacts and are legitimately interested in the outcome of the case that
the judicial task becomes most difficult. Professor Currie has even argued that
where "the interests of two or more states are in conflict, a court has no means of
determining which state has the most significant relationship." 30 While Currie
overstates 3l the problem, there is no question that the task would be a formidable one. This criticism could perhaps best be answered by pointing out that
the problem is a difficult one and simple answers to difficult problems are normally
unsatisfactory. Courts have traditionally embarked on difficult tasks when justice
required without ruining the judicial system. This approach would be more likely
23. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLUM. L. REv.1233 (1963);
Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of TortsLaw and Reason versus The Restatement Second, 28 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB.
700 (1963).
24. Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H.
351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
25. Note, 54 Ky. L.J. 728 (1966); Comment, 62 MicH. L. REv. 1358 (1964).
26. Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 616, 129 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1963).
27. Reese, Conflict of Laws and The Restatement Second, 28 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 699 (1963).
28. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 22, 203 A.2d 796, 806 (1964).
29. Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1251,
1254 (1963).
30. Currie, supra note 23 at 1235.
31. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Ctrrie's Restrained and Enlightened
Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 845, 852 (1961).
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to select forum law than the traditional approach and .that would make the
judicial task easier.
4. While the Restatement's approach does attach some importance to the
governmental interests of the forum state, it will in some. cases subordinate these
interests to those of other states. Thus while this approach does more to further
the forum's interests than the traditional approach it does not further them in all
cases,
5. While the rule of most significant relationship does not outwardly take
into account which of the available rules of law may be better, it does allow the
court more freedom than under the traditional rule by suggesting that the importance of the contacts may be determined by the relevant purposes of the
contending laws. As stated by Ehrenzweig this rule "is readily usable as a tool
32
to give effect to equitable considerations."
C. Currie's Approach.

Brainerd Currie, one of the foremost scholars in the area of conflict of laws,
has observed that if he were ever called on to restate the laws of conflict of laws
and if that allowed a statement of what was reasonable in present law and
what could reasonably be desired in the future, he would:
volunteer the following as a substitute for all that part of the Restatement
dealing with choice of law (for the purpose of finding the rule of decision):
Section 1. When a court is asked to apply the law of a foreign state
different from the law of the forum, it should inquire into the policies
expressed in the respective laws, and into the circumstances in which
it is reasonable for the respective states to assert an interest in the application of those policies. In making these determinations the court should
employ the ordinary process of construction and interpretation.
Section 2. If the court finds that one state has an interest in the application of its policy in the circumstances of the case and the other has none,
it should apply the law of the only interested state.
Section 3. If the court finds an apparent conflict between the interests
of the two states it should reconsider. A moderate and restrained interpretion of the policy or interest of one state or the other may avoid conflict.
Section 4. If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict between
the legitimate interests of the two states is unavoidable, it should apply
the law of the forum.
Section 5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict exists
between the laws of the two other states and the court cannot with
the law of the
justice decline to adjudicate the case it should apply
33
forum-until someone comes along with a better idea.
32. Ehrenzweig, supra note 23 at 705.
33. As suggested by the language utilized Currie's method provides no concrete solution in a case where there is a conflict between two interested states, but
the forum is disinterested. This results from Currie's belief that interests may
not be weighed and the fact that the forum state has no interest to prefer. Currie,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/11
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Section 6. The conflict of interest between states will result in different
dispositions of the same problem, depending on where the action is brought.
If with respect to a particular problem this appears seriously to infringe
a strong national interest in uniformity of decision, the court should not
attempt to improvise a solution sacrificing the legitimate interest of its
own state, but should leave to Congress, exercising its powers under the
full faith and credit clause, the determination of which interest shall be
requirred to yield.34
An analysis of Currie's approach reveals that it is no more than the rule of
lex fori, with one exception. That exception occurs when there is only one state
with a legitimate interest in having its law applied in a particular case and that
state is not the forum. In that case the law of the interested state is applied.
Currie's approach is a logical outgrowth of three principals he puts forth: (1) a
court should as a matter of course look to the law of the forum as the source
of the rule of decision; 35 (2) that the protection of governmental interests should
be the basic goal of conflict of laws; 36 and (3) that where the legitimate interests
of two states conflict, "a court is in no position to 'weigh' the competing interests,
7
or evaluate their relative merits, and choose between them."3

As Currie predicted, his concept of governmental interest has become a controversial aspect of his approach to choice of law problems 38 A government is
interested in having its law applied in a particular case when the application of
that law to that particular set of facts would further those interests that the law
was intended to further.39
Currie's belief that a court should not choose between the legitimate interests
of two states has also been criticized 40 Currie based this proposition on his
belief that (1) this determination was a political function of a high order "which
should not be committed to courts in a democracy," 41 and (2) that this determination was "a function which the courts cannot perform effectively, for they lack
the necessary resources."'42 Having set out the basic elements of Currie's approach
it may now be tested to determine whether it furthers Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations.
The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and The Conflict of Laws, 28 U. CHi.
L. REv. 258 (1961). For an alternative to use of forum law in such a case, Currie
has suggested the court act as a supreme legislative body. CHEATHAM, GiuswoLD,
REESE & ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed. 1964) and Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CoNTrm. PROB. 754, 778 (1963).
34. Currie, supra note 23 at 1242, 1243.
35.
and the
36.
37.
DUKE

Currie, The Constitution and The Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
JudicialFunction, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9 (1958).
Currie, supra note 35.
Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in The Conflict of Laws, 1959

L.J. 171, 176 (1959).

38. Currie, su'pra note 35.

39. Comment, 55

CALIF. L. REv. 74, 80 (1967).
40. Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to

Professor Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 463 (1960); Traynor, supra note 31.
41. Currie, supra note 37 at 176.
42. Currie, supra note 37 at 176.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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(1) Currie's approach is vulnerable to the argument that it does not provide
for predictable results and that it will promote forum shopping. This argument
is valid only where there are two or more legitimately interested states whose
laws would likely give rise to different results in which the plaintiff could bring
his action. In such a case the plaintiff could choose to bring his action in the state
whose law would provide him the most favorable result. In defense of Currie's
approach it may be argued that the "ideal of uniformity is given too high a
priority," 43 and that "the possibilities of forum shopping are apt to be exagger44
ated."
(2) It may also be argued that Currie's approach fails to give due deference
to the laws of other states. This results from Currie's belief that courts should
not weigh competing interests and should always apply forum law in case of a
conflict between two legitimately interested states. Currie's use of a "moderate and
restrained interpretation" in determining whether a state has a legitimate interest
would make his approach less vulnerable to this criticism. Nevertheless his
approach would seem to be the least desirable of those discussed in reference to
this choice-influencing consideration.
(3) At first blush Currie's approach would seem to make the judicial task
the least difficult of any of the proposed approaches. His approach will normally
result in the application of forum law with which the judge is more familiar. The
judge would have to determine if the states involved had a legitimate interest in
having their law applied, but he would not have to determine which interest
was greater. Some scholars have attempted to utilize Currie's argument that
courts are not capable of balancing the interests of two competing states in criticizing his approach. 45 Justice Traynor observed "that determination of the existence
and scope of forum policy demands the weighing of many policies and interests," 40
and Ehrenzweig wondered if the state court's task of determining whether an
interest was legitimate did not "involve the very process of weighing which is to
be avoided by the proposed abdication of the judiciary?" 47 Currie conceded that
this criticism was a valid one, but asserted that there was "an important difference
between a courts construing domestic law with moderation in order to avoid
conflict with a foreign interest and its holding that a foreign interest is paramount." 48 Currie feels that the former encourages legislative correction of error
and law review criticism while the latter would inhibit and confound it. It is
clear that there is a significant difference in a weighing and balancing of policies
by a court which on one hand determines the existence of a legitimate interest
and on the other holds that one such interest is superior to another.
43. Currie, supra note 16 at 244.
44. Kramer, Interests and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 RuTGEMs L.
REv. 523, 560 (1959).
45. Hill, supra note 40; Leflar, ConstitutionalLimits on Free Choice of Law,
28 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROB. 706 (1963).

46. Traynor, supra note 31 at 855.
47. Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rides," 49
CALIF. L. Rav. 240, 247, 248 (1961).

48. Currie, supra note 33 at 759.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/11
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. (4) It is obvious that Currie's approach is designed to further the forum's

governmental interests and if applied it would accomplish this purpose.
(5) Currie's approach does not take into account which of the possible laws
is better. His willingness to allow the courts to determine if the interest of the
state is in fact a legitimate one would probably allow a court to avoid applying

a capricious law by determining that the state had no legitimate interest in its
application4
III. MISSOURi LAw

While Missouri followed the traditional approach to choice of law problems
in two recent cases, 50 the Missouri Supreme Court has indicated that if raised in
the proper case, 51 it would examine the new approaches taken in other jurisdictions. In order to further evaluate the choice of law approaches previously discussed an attempt will now be made to show the probable effect of the adoption
of certain of these new rules on selected areas of Missouri law.
A. Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents
52

Robinson v. Gaines
Plaintiff filed suit in Missouri against her deceased husband's estate for injuries received in an automobile accident in New Mexico. The domicil of the
two parties had been Missouri and under Missouri law a widow could maintain
an action against the administrator of her deceased husband's estate for personal
injuries 3 The court, following the traditional approach, applied the law of New
Mexico under which plaintiff had no right of action. The court based its decision
on both statutory 54 and case law.55
The Missouri court would have reached a different result if it had applied
either the Restatement's or Currie's approach. The Restatement has determined
that this situation may be governed by a more definite rule than that set out
in section 379. It considers that on this issue the parties' domicil is the state with
the greatest interest and that an application of section 379 will always result
in a determination that "whether one member of a family is immune from tort
liability to another member is determined by the local law of the state of their
domicil." 56
49. For a court which has applied a modified version of Currie's approach see
Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
50. Noe v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1966);
Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1966).
51. The Supreme Court ruled the case presented no conflict of laws problem
when asked to consider the new approaches in Girth v. Beaty Grocery Co., 407
S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1966).

52. 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1960).
53. Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. En Banc 1957).
54. Section 507.020, RSMo 1959.

55. Newlin v. St. Louis & S.F.R., 222"Mo. 375, 121 S.W. 125 (1909).
56. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND), CONFLicr OF LAws § 390 g. at 142 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1964).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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The rule of interspousal immunity is an butgrowth of the archaic 'fiction
that husband and wife were one person. This fiction resulted in the suspension of
the legal existence of the wife during the marriage.57 The rule is justified today
by two rather dubious and somewhat contradictory reasons: (1) That if interspousal tort actions are allowed this will disturb domestic tranquillity. (2) That
the allowance of interspousal tort actions would encourage collusive claims and
thereby greatly injure insurance companies.5" If the first reason is the interest
which New Mexico desires to further by this law, then it was meant to benefit
only couples domiciled in New Mexico. If it was the second reason it was
surely meant to protect New Mexico rather than Missouri insurance companies.
Since it is obvious that Missouri does have an interest in this case it is clear that
if Currie's approach were used Missouri law would be applied even if New Mexico
had an interest in the case.
While the Restatement contends that its approach "represents the trend of
the modern decisions," 50 a number of recent decisions have followed the old
approach. 60 For the most part these decisions adhere to precedent rather than
reason in reaching their conclusions. A number of cases 0' have accepted the Restatement's position and it appears the better approach for dealing with the issue
of interspousal immunity. In deciding this question, the Restatement's result is
more certain and predictable than the traditional approach and it applies the law
of the most interested state. It is more certain since family immunities are not
subject to change each time the family enters a different state. 62 Currie's approach would reach the same result as the Restatement in Robinson, but if the
action were brought in New Mexico that state's law would have been applied if
the state were found to have any legitimate interest in having its law applied.
83
This would be the case even though Missouri's interest was more substantial.
B. Guest Statutes
Neikardt v. Knipmeyer6 4
Plaintiff sued in Missouri for injuries he suffered in an automobile accident
in South Dakota. The trip was planned in plaintiff's home in Missouri and was to
include a stop in Canada as well as in South Dakota. Under Missouri law guests
injured in automobile accidents may recover damages for negligent conduct, but
57. Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of
Laws: Law and Reason Versus The Restatement, 15 U. Pm. L. REv. 397 (1954).
58. Ford, supra note 57.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND); CONFLICT OF LAws § 390 g., Reporters note
at 145 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
60. Wolozin v. Wolozin, 149 Conn. 739, 182 A.2d 8 (1962); Shaw v. Lee, 258
N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 136 S.E.2d 303 (S.C. 1964).
61. Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill.2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Thompson v.
Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86,
215 A.2d 677 (1966).
62. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
63. See generally Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 973 (1964).
64. 420 S.W.2d 27 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
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in South Dakota willful and wanton misconduct must be shown for recovery.
65 "
were citizens and
Despite the fact that plaintiff and apparently defendant
applied. The court
law
Dakota
that
South
ruled
court
the
of
Missouri,
residents
that tort
indicating
decision
Missouri
to
no
cited
pointed out that it "had been
the tort
where
state
the
of
law
the
by
actions tried in Missouri are not governed
66
might
that
approaches
new
of
the
any
occurred," but no mention was made of
have been utilized.
The Restatement has not formulated a more specific rule than that set out
in section 379 for all guest passenger cases. It has, however, stated that "the circumstances under which a guest passenger has a right of action against the driver
of an automobile for injuries suffered as a result of the latter's negligence will be
determined by the local law of their common domicil, if at least this is the state
from which they departed on their trip and that to which they intended to
67
return, rather than by the local law of the state where the accident occurred."
It is often difficult to determine what policies a state hopes to further by a
particular law and the task is no easier in the case of guest statutes. The most
comprehensive statement of policies which a guest statute might intend to further
is set out in the case of Dym v. Gordon.68 There the court stated that:
The policy underlying Colorado's law is threefold: the protection of Colorado drivers and their insurance carriers against fraudulent claims, the preof injured parties
vention of suits by 'ungrateful guests,' and the priority
in other cars in the assets of the negligent defendant.69
Assuming, as most courts70 and scholars 71 do, that a state is concerned with
protecting its own citizens, companies, and courts and not those of other states,
it becomes apparent that the application of South Dakota law in Neihardt would
not further the first or second policy of that state. As to the third policy there is
no indication in the case that any South Dakota citizen was injured or that any
other injured party would be prejudiced if Neihardt recovered.
Since Missouri citizens, and probably a Missouri insurance company, were involved, it is obvious that Missouri has a legitmate interest in the case. Thus had
Currie's approach been utilized Missouri law would have been applied.
In dealing with the guest statute cases, no one approach seems clearly superior
as was the case when the issue was interspousal immunity. While a number of
65. While the court does not state that the defendant is a citizen and
resident of Missouri, this fact is implied by the courts reference to other cases to
support its decision in which both parties were citizens and residents of the state.
66. Neihardt v. Knipmeyer, 420 S.W.2d 27, 29 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
67. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379, comment on subsection(3) at 9 (Trent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
68. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
69. Dym v. Gordon, supra note 68 at 124, 209 N.E. at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at
466.
70. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
71. Currie, supra note 23; Trautman, A' Comiment, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 465
(1967), compare Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLuM. L. R-v.
1247 (1963).
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recent cases 72 have applied the Restatement's approach there have been differences
of opinion as to which are the more important contacts and interests, and even
courts in the same state have reached seemingly inconsistent resultsY 3 Thus some
courts 74 continue to reject the Restatement on the ground that it remains uncertain
and provides unpredictable results. This uncertainty would also attach to Currie's
approach since in the difficult cases each state would have a legitimate interest
and his approach would seem certain to encourage forum shopping. In Neihardt,
however, either the Restatement's or Currie's approach would seem to provide
a more desirable result than the traditional approach. Missouri clearly had the
more substantial interest under any interpretation and its law should have been
applied. It also seems likely that the Restatement's approach will become more
certain with use since courts are likely to come to a general agreement as to
which are the more significant contacts and interests7 5
IV. CoNcLusIoN
The only definite conclusion that may be drawn from this analysis of the
three approaches is that each of them has some good and some bad features. There
can be little doubt that no one of these approaches will be satisfactory to all courts
or all scholars. Nevertheless of the three approaches discussed and evaluated it
would seem that the Restatement's approach provides the most logical alternative
to those seeking a new choice of law rule. The two most significant weaknesses
of this approach are its failure to provide predictable results and the difficulty
involved in its application. These weaknesses are likely to be reduced as courts
become more experienced in applying this approach. In the two areas of Missouri
law discussed in this comment, the Restatement has already overcome these
weaknesses in the area of interspousal immunity and has taken limited steps
toward overcoming them in the guest statute cases. In contrast, the more significant
weaknesses found in the traditional rule and Currie's approach seem to be an
inherent result of the approach itself and they seem impossible to correct without
abandonment. It is for these reasons that this writer suggests that Missouri abandon its illusory isle of stability, the traditional approach, and adopt the more
fldxible Restatement approach.
ROBERT E. NoRTHRip

72. Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Dym v. Gordon, 16
N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26
Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
73. Compare Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Dym v. Gordan, swpra note 72; Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc.

2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965).
74. Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); White v. King, 244 Md.
348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
75. See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 12 (1964).
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